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LIST OF PARTIES 
The above caption of this case before the Utah Court of 
Appeals contains the names of all parties to the most recent 
proceeding before the agency whose order is sought to be 
reviewed. 
This said proceeding was initiated by means of a request 
directed to the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) on 
behalf of petitioner that UADD reopen two matters and continue 
administrative proceedings based on petitioner's charges against 
Sears, Roebuck and Company, and its personnel director, Pat Muir. 
This request was denied, and Sears has not been held to 
answer. However, a copy of that request and copies of subsequent 
pertinent documents have been mailed to Sears' attorney, Roger 
H. Bullock, 6th Floor Boston Building, 9 Exchange Place, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Subsection 78-2a-3(2)(a) of the Utah Code, since it 
involves a review a final order from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of a state agency other than an agency exceoted. 
Jurisdiction was invoked by means of a Petition for Writ 
of Review filed in compliance with Rule 14 of the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, namely, the Petition for Writ of Review 
dated and filed April 4, 1994, seeking review of the respondent's 
Order Denying Motion for Review dated March 10, 1994, which Order 
included an affirmance of respondent's Administrative Law Judge's 
Order of Dismissal dated June 10, 1993, which in turn denied an 
evidentiary hearing to review the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Division's decision dated May 7, 1993 refusing to resume 
administrative action despite Petitioner's request dated March 4, 
1993. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The petitioner asserts that the pertinent issues are as 
follows: 
1. Where a charge of discrimination is timely filed 
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD), and UADD 
subsequently discontinues its administrative process at the 
request of the charging party, and a lawsuit based on the charges 
is timely brought and then dismissed without prejudice to 
administrative action, is UADD without jurisdiction to resume the 
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administrative process on the basis that the request to resume is 
made more than 180 days after the original discriminatory acts? 
2. Where a charge of discrimination is timely filed 
with UADD, and UADD subsequently discontinues its administrative 
process at the request of the charging party so that federal 
remedies can be pursued, and a lawsuit based on the charges is 
timely brought but federal remedies are not pursued, and the suit 
is dismissed without prejudice to administrative action, is UADD 
without jurisdiction to resume the administrative process on the 
basis that an action under federal law has been commenced? 
Both of these issues involve questions of correct 
statutory interpretation for which there is no need to give 
deference to the discretion of the agency. King v. Industrial 
Commission, 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah App. 1993). The statutes give no 
explicit nor implicit grant of discretion to the respondent to 
interpret the extent of these limits to its jurisdiction. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The interpretation of the following subsections of 
Section 34-35-7.1 of the Utah Code is determinative of the issues 
in this appeal: 
(l)(c) A request for agency action made 
under this section shall be filed within 180 
days after the alleged discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice occurred. 
(16) The commencement of an action under 
federal law for relief based uoon any act 
prohibited by this chapter bars the 
commencement or continuation of any 
adjudicative proceeding before the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Division in connection with 
the same claims under this chapter. ... 
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The interpretation of Section 78-12-40 of the Utah Code 
may also govern: 
If any action is commenced within due time 
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is 
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of action otherwise than 
upon the meritsf and the time limited either by 
law or contract for commencing the same shall 
have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and 
the cause of action survives, his 
representatives, may commence a new action 
within one year after the reversal or failure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Petition for Review in this matter was filed because 
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) refused to resume 
consideration of petitioner Federicofs claims of harassment and 
discrimination against Sears, Roebuck and Company. 
About a year after Federico originally filed her first 
charge against Sears, there still having been no determination 
and order, Federico had UADD discontinue its proceedings so she 
could pursue the matter in court. She then obtained an attorney 
who filed an action against Sears in state court. Sears moved to 
dismiss on the basis that the exclusive forum for pursuing claims 
under state law was UADD. The judge agreed and dismissed the 
action without prejudice to further agency action. 
At that point, Federico could not pursue any rights 
under federal law, either. She therefore requested UADD resume 
consideration of her charges against Sears. 
Two reasons have been supplied by respondent for UADD's 
denial of Federicofs request. First, the request to reopen was 
submitted more than 180 days after the acts of harassment and 
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discrimination. Second, Federico had invoked federal law by 
requesting UADD to discontinue its proceedings, and so there 
never again could be any continuation of agency action. 
The facts in more detail are as follows, with citations 
to the Record from the Agency (R.): 
1. Petitioner Federico filed two charges of 
discrimination against Sears, the first one dated April 9, 1990 
and the second dated September 21, 1990, with the UADD and the 
federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). R. 1-2. 
2. When there had been no resolution by March of 1991, 
Federico asked if there was a way she could move the case along. 
It was suggested that she could get a right-to-sue letter, and an 
attorney could then pursue the matter in court. R. 9. 
3. She followed that suggested procedure, obtaining a 
letter dated March 21, 1991 from UADD stating that no further 
action would be taken by that agency, and a Notice of Right to 
Sue dated April 18, 1991 from EEOC. R. 3-7. 
4. Federico contacted an attorney who on or about July 
16, 1991, filed an employment discrimination complaint in state, 
rather than federal, district court. There was never any 
soecific reference to federal law in that action. R. 16-20. 
5. After several months of discovery, Sears moved to 
dismiss that action on the basis that the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Act did not give jurisdiction to the district 
court. The case was accordingly dismissed without prejudice to 
further agency action on October 19, 1992. R. 9, 21-23. 
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6. A copy of the documents referred to hereafter were 
generally contemporaneously mailed to the attorney Sears had 
employed, Roger H. Bullock, 6th Floor Boston Building, 9 Exchanae 
Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. R. 11, 26, 34, 38, 40. That 
attorney opposed Federico's pursuit of this matter. R. 28. 
7. By letter dated March 4, 1993, Federico requested 
UADD to resume consideration of her charges against Sears. R. 9-
23, 8. By letter dated May 7, 1993, UADD declined the request, 
stating, "The time for filing has passed." R. 24. 
8. On May 21, 1993, Federico requested an evidentiary 
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). R. 25-26. The 
ALJ, Timothy C. Allen, denied this request on the basis that the 
respondent Industrial Commission lacked jurisdiction. He 
reasoned that since Federico had caused UADD to cease 
consideration of her charges, her request to reopen those claims 
had to be treated as new claims, and as such were filed after the 
180-day limitation period. Furthermore, the ALJ ruled that 
federal action had been initiated, barring consideration of the 
claims. R. 29-30. 
9. Federico filed a timely Motion for Review, dated 
July 8, 1993. R. 32-34. This was followed by an Order Denyinq 
Motion for Review dated March 10, 1994, affirming the Order of 
Dismissal on the grounds set forth by the ALJ. R. 35-37. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The legislature has enacted a law to remedy problems 
found in the work place. This law should be liberally construed 
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to effectuate its purpose. There are constraints to avoid 
duplicate action, but these constraints must not be interpreted 
to bar any remedy. 
2. A request for an agency to resume action regarding a 
prohibited employment practice need not be made within 180 days 
of the occurrence of that practice. The 180 dav limitation only 
applies to the request for the agency to initiate action in the 
first instance. The saving statute and the principles evidenced 
in that statute and in the rule pertaining to amending pleadings 
demonstrate that a subsequent request for agency action need not 
be filed as soon as an initial request. 
3. The bar against agency action upon commencement of 
an action under federal law does not apply merely because an 
aggrieved party has a right to file such an action. Even the 
filing of such an action does not prohibit resumption of agency 
action where no decision under federal law has been nor can be 
made. Resumption of agency action would not then duplicate court 
action. Rather, it would provide the only possible remedy for 
the prohibited employment practices. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT SHOULD BE LIBERALLY 
CONSTRUED TO ACCOMPLISH ITS REMEDIAL PURPOSES. 
It is a. remedial statute. 
The language of the Antidiscrimination Act, Chapter 35 
of Title 34 of the Utah Code, demonstrates a clear intent on the 
part of the legislature to root out discrimination by employers. 
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For example, Section 34-35-5 of the Code contains 
numerous subsections granting various powers to the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Division (UADD), enabling it to remedy 
wrongful acts against employees and orevent their recurrence. It 
is clear that these powers are expansive to fully allow the UADD 
to accomplish those purposes. The UADD can appoint 
investigators, publish rules, pass upon complaints, hold hearings 
and subpoena witnesses, issue publications, recommend policies 
and legislation, conduct educational programs, and so on. 
In Section 34-35-7 of the Utah Code, the Industrial 
Commission is given the responsibility to act when a person 
claims to be aggrieved by a discriminatory and prohibited 
employment practice. But it is not granted the power to 
redefine a "prohibited employment practice" nor to limit the 
extent of its own jurisdiction. 
In Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 
436, 441, 140 P.2d 644 (1943), the Supreme Court stated, "We have 
held that the Industrial Act must be liberally construed and that 
by such construction we should attempt to effectuate its 
beneficent and humane objects." 
Likewise the employment act seeking to remedy 
discrimination problems must be liberally construed to effectuate 
its purposes. 
This in accordance with the general principle found in 
the statement, "This Court's primary responsibility in construing 
legislation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature." 
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American Coal Co, v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984). 
The Act has three purposes. 
The Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act evidences three 
legislative intentions pertinent to this case. 
As mentioned above, the first and major legislative 
intent is to give employees a remedy for wrongful acts committed 
against employees, and to prevent the recurrence of such acts. 
That is shown in the sections cited above. 
Secondly, the legislature evidenced an intent to quickly 
make the offending party aware of the claims against it by 
requiring the charging party to request agency action within 180 
days after the wrongful acts. Subsection 34-35-7.1(1) (c ). 
Thirdly, the legislature has intended to avoid a 
duplicate adjudication in the pursuit of a remedy for wrongful 
acts. This is shown in subsections 34-35-7.1(15) and (16). In 
subsection (15), agency orocedures are made the exclusive remedy 
under state law. Subsection (16) follows, prohibiting the 
simultaneous pursuit of federal and state remedies. 
However, the first purpose is thwarted, and the second 
and third purposes are not advanced, if the Act is construed to 
deny UADD jurisdiction to resume agency consideration of a claim, 
no matter what, where either (1) the request to resume action is 
made more than 180 days after the occurrence giving rise to the 
claim, or (2) agency action has once been discontinued to permit 
pursuit of federal claims. 
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2. A REQUEST TO RESUME AGENCY ACTION NEED NOT BE MADE 
WITHIN THE 180 DAYS APPLICABLE TO AN INITIAL REQUEST. 
A request to resume action is not "a request for agency action." 
Subsection 34-35-7.1(1) (c ) of the Utah Code states: 
A request for agency action made under this 
section shall be filed within 180 days after 
the alleged discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice occurred. 
An issue has arisen as to the meaning of "a request for 
agency action made under this section." 
The Industrial Commission has determined that Federico's 
request of the UADD to resume consideration of her claims is "a 
request for agency action made under this section." However, a 
request to resume consideration of claims is not identified in 
Section 34-35-7.1. 
The requests identified in Section 34-35-7.1 include the 
initial request referred to in subsection (1), a request by an 
employer for assistance as specified in subsection (2), a request 
for an evidentiary hearing described in subsections (4) and (5), 
and a request for review allowed in subsection (11). It is 
unreasonable to construe "a request for agency action made under 
this section" to mean any one of these requests, and to thus 
require that they all be made "within 180 days after the alleged 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice occurred." 
Furthermore, the language of subsection (7) would 
indicate that "a request for agency action" refers only to the 
initial request: 
Prior to commencement of an evidentiary 
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hearing, the party filing the request for 
agency action may reasonably and fairly amend 
any allegation, and the respondent may amend 
its answer. Those amendments may be made 
during or after a hearing but only with 
permission of the presiding officer. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Thus, although an amendment may request additional 
agency action, it would appear to fall outside of the definition 
of "a request for agency action" that would have to be made 
"within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice occurred." 
This was the result in the case of Simmons v. Mountain 
Bell, 806 P.2d 6 (Mont. 1990). 
In that case, Simmons filed a complaint with the Montana 
Human Rights Commission (HRC) on January 21, 1981 for Mountain 
Bell's discrimination against her based on her physical handicap. 
Mountain Bell terminated her employment on June 10, 1981. So she 
filed an amended complaint with HRC on January 19, 1982 alleging 
retaliation. 
Mountain Bell argued that this amendment was barred, 
being filed more than 180 days after the termination. The 
Montana Supreme Court found that it was not barred, since Rule 
15(c) of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an 
amendment relates back to the initial filing. 
So the statutory reference to "a request for agency 
action made under this section" that must be made "within 180 
days after the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice occurred" would seem to be restricted to the initial 
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request for the agency to take action concerning a matter or 
related matters. 
This idea of "a request for agency action" being 
different from its ordinary meaning, and having aspects of a term 
of art, is bolstered by its use in the Administrative Procedures 
Act. Subsection 63-46b-3(l) states that adjudicative 
proceedings are commenced by (a) an agency itself giving notice 
of agency action or by "(b) a request for agency action, if 
proceedings are commenced by persons other than the agency." 
It also appears that it is appropriate to refer to rules 
and statutes governing civil actions in general when deciding 
questions pertaining to actions before an agency. Subsection 63-
46b-7(l) provides for discovery, referring as needed to the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Then subsection 63-46b-7(2) grants 
subpoena and other powers, with such powers evidently governed by 
statutes applicable in civil cases. 
Thus "a request for agency action" would appear to be 
analogous to a complaint in a civil action. 
Action by UADD was stayed. 
Federico's request that the agency discontinue its 
processes should be construed as analogous to a request for a 
stay before a court. 
This would seem particularly true in light of the fact 
that Federico, like many others in her position before an agency, 
was not represented by legal counsel. Actions before agencies 
are generally not governed by evidence and other rules as strict 
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as those governing court actions where legal counsel are the 
norm. See subsection 63-46b-8(1)(c). An agency order must give 
notice of the right and time limits for requesting further 
review. Subsection 63-46b-10(1)(g). Construing the agency 
action to have been stayed, rather than dismissed, would comport 
better with the tenor of agency actions. 
As it is, the Industrial Commission has taken the 
position that though unrepresented, Federico forever and 
unalterably forfeited all rights she had against Sears under Utah 
law when she obtained a letter from the UADD discontinuing its 
administrative process. Federico was not clearly informed 
beforehand that the Commission would take such a rigid posture. 
Furthermore, a stay would have accomplished the purpose 
of allowing the pursuit of federal remedies. 
For example, in the case of National Cash Register v. 
Riner, 413 A.2d 890 (Del. Super. 1979), the court found that the 
ADEA did not require that state action be dismissed, but merely 
stayed. Likewise, under federal and Utah law, there could be a 
simultaneous staying of the state action and initiation of an 
action under the Civil Rights Act. 
The saving statute preserves jurisdiction. 
Even if UADD's discontinuance of administrative 
proceedings is deemed analogous to a dismissal, that dismissal 
must be without prejudice. Although Federico obtained no relief 
from UADD, it was not based on any failure on the merits. As 
acknowledged by the Commission's Administrative Law Judge in the 
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Order of Dismissal dated June 10, 1993, "presumably a new request 
for agency action could be made and could be acted upon, if 
timely." R. 29. 
However, if the discontinuance of agency action is 
deemed a dismissal, and the request to resume such action deemed 
a refiling, then that request has indeed been timely made, based 
on Section 78-12-40 of the Utah Code: 
If any action is commenced within due time 
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is 
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of action otherwise than 
upon the merits, and the time limited either by 
law or contract for commencing the same shall 
have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and 
the cause of action survives, his 
representatives, may commence a new action 
within one year after the reversal or failure. 
This Utah saving statute is not superseded, preempted, 
or contravened by any other statute dealing with actions before 
state agencies in general, or dealing with the specific subject 
and the specific agencies involved in the instant matter. 
Section 78-12-5.3 of the Utah Code defines "action" as a 
"civil action wherein affirmative relief is sought." So it does 
not apply to a criminal action. But there is no reason to 
believe that in the nineteenth century, when the legislature 
enacted substantially this same statute, the legislative intent 
was to exclude all actions before an agency. Section 2893, Rev. 
St. 1898. 
So it is entirely appropriate that the statute apply in 
the instant matter, if there has been a deemed dismissal. 
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The saving statute should be liberally construed. 
The saving statute is remedial and should receive a 
liberal construction. 
A statute extending the time for the 
institution of a new action on failure of the 
original action for reasons other than on the 
merits should be liberally construed in 
furtherance of its purpose. 54 
C.J.S. Limitations of Actions, Sec. 240 at 320. 
Utah courts historically have followed this principle in 
giving a liberal construction to the saving statute. 
In the case of Standard Fed. Sav. Ji Loan v. Kirkbride, 
821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991), Standard Federal filed a timely 
complaint seeking a deficiency judgment following a sale under a 
trust deed. Summons were not timely served within 120 days after 
this filing, and the case was dismissed. 
Kirkbride first argued that the following language of 
section 5-1-32 of the Utah Code barred any refiling if the 
initial three months had expired: 
At any time within three months after any 
sale of prooerty under a trust deed, as 
hereinabove provided, an action may be 
commenced to recover the balance due upon the 
obligation for which the trust deed was given 
as security .... 
The Utah Supreme Court did not interpret that statute to 
provide such an unalterable deadline for a refiling: 
Kirkbride and Soule contend that the 
language indicates a purpose to bar any action 
not initiated within three months and then 
resolved on the merits for the plaintiff. 
There is nothing in the language of the statute 
suggesting an intent to reach such a draconian 
result. Standard, supra, 821 P.2d at 1138. 
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Likewise, there is nothing in the language of subsection 
34-35-7.l(l)(c) of the Utah Code, the statute pertaining to a 
request for agency action in the instant matter, that would show 
the intent to reach such a draconian result: 
A request for agency action made under this 
section shall be filed within 180 days after 
the alleged discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice occurred. 
Kirkbride also argued that the saving statute should 
extend general limitations only, not the specific three-month 
limitation for filing a deficiency action after a trustee's sale 
on a trust deed. The Utah Supreme Court was unpersuaded. 
The relevant inquiry is whether the legislature made 
plain an intention to bar forever claims of those who 
are guilty of a procedural misstep. [Citations] As 
previously noted, we find no such indication here. 
:id. at 1138. 
Likewise, the relevant inquiry in the instant matter is 
whether the legislature made plain an intention to give one year 
for refiling to those who are guilty of a procedural misstep in 
a district court where they would be expected to have counsel, 
but not one day to those who are guilty of a procedural misstep 
before an agency where the rules are relaxed and attorneys are 
less common. To find such an intention would be to construe a 
remedial statute much too strictly. 
Sears has not been prejudiced. 
The Supreme Court then examined the purpose for the 
comparatively short three month period. In exchange for a speedy 
remedy of foreclosure and sale, the creditor had the obligation 
to promptly put the debtor on notice it was seeking a deficiency 
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by commencing an action. The Court found that purpose was 
accomplished, even though Kirkbride managed to have the first 
action dismissed. 
Likewise, in exchange for a simplified agency procedure, 
an employee has the obligation to promptly put the employer on 
notice he or she is alleging a prohibited employment practice by 
promptly requesting agency action. The employer received that 
notice in the instant matter. 
Not only did Federico give notice of her allegations 
against Sears by means of the request for agency action, but her 
actions thereafter fully showed her intent to continue pursuit of 
this matter. She did nothing to lull Sears into feeling that she 
would not pursue the matter or to leave Sears in a lengthy period 
of uncertainty. As shown in the chronology appearing above, 
Federico!s longest period of inaction was less than 6 months, the 
period after her state action was dismissed without prejudice to 
agency action, and before the filing of her request that the 
agency resume action. This was much less than the statutory 
period of one year. 
3. TAKING THE FIRST STEP TO ASSERT FEDERAL RIGHTS DOES 
NOT FOREVER PRECLUDE ASSERTION OF STATE RIGHTS. 
Federico did not commence a federal action. 
Subsection 34-35-7.1(16) of the Utah Code states: 
(16) The commencement of an action under 
federal law for relief based upon any act 
prohibited by this chapter bars the 
commencement or continuation of any 
adjudicative proceeding before the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Division in connection with 
17 
the same claims under this chapter. ... 
An issue has arisen as to the meaning of "the 
commencement of an action under federal law." 
On page two of its Order Denying Motion for Review, the 
Industrial Commission stated: 
The record is clear that Ms. Federico 
withdrew her claim of discrimination from the 
Anti-Discrimination Division and then filed a 
court action to enforce her claim under federal 
law. R. 36. 
The record is indeed clear that Federico took steps to 
assert her rights in court. It is not clear that she "filed a 
court action to enforce her claim under federal law." 
There was reference in the Complaint filed in state 
court to the EEOC, but no other reference to federal law. R. 18. 
It was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. R. 22. 
This dismissal was based on a motion citing Utah law, not federal 
law. R. 9. So Federico apparently did not file "a court action 
to enforce her claim under federal law." 
The state court may have lacked federal jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, the state court in which Federico filed her 
complaint may not have had jurisdiction to enforce discrimination 
claims under the federal law. There has been a split of 
authority as to whether state courts can exercise jurisdiction 
over Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 
In Donnelly v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 874 F.2d 402 
(7th Cir. 1989), the Seventh Circuit found that the state courts 
had concurrent jurisdiction. In so doing, it acknowledged that 
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the opposite result had been reached by the Ninth Circuit in 
Valenzuela y_^  Kraft, Inc. , 739 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1984), which in 
turn had relied on dictum from the Supreme Court's decision in 
Lehman v^ Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 164 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 2698, 2703 
n. 12, 69 L.Ed.2d 548 (1981). It also acknowledged the opposite 
result in the case of Bradshaw v. General Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 
110, 112 (3rd Cir. 1986), and overruled its decision in Brown v 
Reliable Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 852 F.2d 932 (7th Cir. 1988) 
which had assumed that Title VII jurisdiction was exclusively 
federal. 
So when Federico filed an action in state court, there 
may well have been no "commencement of an action under federal 
law" even possible in that forum. 
Federico lost all federal rights. 
Furthermore, by the time the state court action had been 
dismissed, there was definitely no possibility of a "commencement 
of an action under federal law." 
The Tenth Circuit, which governs the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah, has ruled that if an 
action under Title VII is dismissed without prejudice, the filing 
period is not tolled by that dismissed action, nor is the action 
saved by a state saving statute. Brown v. Hartshorne Public 
School Dist. No. 1, 926 F.2d 959, 961 (10th Cir. 1991). There is 
no federal saving statute, and the existence of a federal statute 
of limitations renders a state saving statute inapplicable. 
Thus in her state action, Federico did not specifically 
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assert her rights to relief under federal law, and perhaps could 
not have asserted such rights; and ever since dismissal of that 
action, she clearly was barred from asserting those rights. 
So the record is not "clear that Ms. Federico withdrew 
her claim of discrimination from the Anti-Discrimination Division 
and then filed a court action to enforce her claim under federal 
law." R. 36. And it is not clear that there has been a 
"commencement of an action under federal law." Subsection 34-35-
7.1(16) of the Utah Code. 
A preparatory step is not the same as commencing. 
Now it is clear that Federico took action that made 
possible the "commencement of an action under federal law," but 
making it possible is not the same as doing it. 
A "commencement of an action under federal law" must be 
defined as an overt filing. It cannot be defined as taking a 
preparatory step. To define commencement as taking a preparatory 
step would result in discontinuing every "adjudicative proceeding 
before the Utah Antidiscrimination Division" that has been filed, 
since every filing includes a filing with the federal EEOC, a 
necessary predicate to enforcement under federal law. R. 1, 2. 
42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). 
Continuance of agency action is only temporarily barred. 
As a further matter of statutory construction, in 
reaching its ruling, the Industrial Commission has necessarily 
construed subsection 34-35-7.1(16) of the Utah Code to include 
the words "forever and unalterably": 
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(16) The commencement of an action under 
federal law for relief based upon any act 
prohibited by this chapter [forever and 
unalterably] bars the commencement or 
continuation of any adjudicative proceeding 
before the Utah Antidiscrimination Division in 
connection with the same claims under this 
chapter, ... [Bracketed words added.] 
There aopears to be no legislative intent that would be 
furthered by thus augmenting the effect of this exception to the 
availability of a remedy under the act. 
It seems more compatible with the purpose of the act to 
construe this exception to bar any adjudicative proceeding before 
the UADD from the time an action under federal law is commenced, 
and continuing thereafter unless and until a decision on the 
merits has not and cannot be rendered under federal law. 
In the case of Corrente v. St. Josephf s Hosp. and Health 
Center, 730 F. Supp. 493 (N.D.N.Y. 1990), the court examined the 
relationship between state and federal discrimination actions and 
the purposes behind the interrelating procedures. Specifically, 
the court examined the purposes behind the ADEA provision that a 
federal action would supersede (construed to mean "stay," _Id. at 
497) any state action. 
The result reached in the Corrente opinion was that it 
was most likely that the purpose was to conserve judicial 
resources, while giving some primacy to the federal action. Id. 
at 499. 
That would also be the most logical purpose of the bar 
in subsection 34-35-7.1(16) against beginning or continuing 
action before UADD once an action under federal law has been 
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commenced. 
Only a decision on the merits is a complete bar. 
It is illogical to attribute to the legislature a desire 
to withhold from a wronged employee any possibility of any relief 
merely because he or she has attempted to enforce perceived 
federal rights. This is contrary to the intent of the 
legislature to ensure the availability of a remedy. 
As indicated above, if the UADD proceeds to adjudicate 
this matter, there will be no duplication, and there will be no 
lack of deference to any decision on the merits. There will only 
be, finally, a forum in which the validity of Federico's charges 
can be determined. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this Court should decide that UADD has 
jurisdiction to consider on the merits Federico's two charges of 
discrimination against Sears, the first one dated April 9, 1990 
and the second dated September 21, 1990, filed with UADD under 
its numbers 90-0262 and 91-0008, respectively. 
This decision would be based upon a liberal construction 
of remedial statutes to further their purposes. 
Federico's request for UADD to continue its 
administrative proceedings would either not be construed as an 
initial request for agency action required to be filed within 180 
days after the offending occurrences, or it would be deemed saved 
by the saving statute. 
Also, her actions in originally discontinuing agency 
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action would either not be deemed the commencement of an action 
under federal law, or the bar against continuation of state 
action would not be deemed to extend past the point in time when 
a decision on the merits has not and cannot be rendered under 
federal law. 
Thus there is no impediment for this Court to decide 
that UADD can proceed to consider Federico's two charges of 
discrimination against Sears. 
DATED this 3*^ day of <2^^ , 1994. 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ g ^ 
LYNN P. HEWARD 
Attorney for Charging Party 
and Petitioner 
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May 7 , 1993 
Lynn P. Heward. Attorney 
923 East b350 South, #K 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84117 
He: Jennie Federico v. Sears, Roebuck & Company 
UADD NOS. 90-0262 and 91-0008 
Dear Mr. Heward: 
Regretfully 1 must decline your request to refile an action 
in the above case. The time for filing has passed, and our 
documents show that Ms. Federico clearly requested that we 
discontinue our administrative processes. We do not issue 
right to sue letters for state court, and our letter cannot 
be construed to be one. Only the EEOC (a federal agency) 
issues right to sue letters for federal court. Apparently 
your client's previous attorney did not review the law in 
this area. 
Sincerely. 
Anna R. Jensen 
Director 
ARJ/ms 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6615 
JENNIE FEDERICO, * 
Charging Party, * ORDER OF 
vs. * DISMISSAL 
* 
SEARS, * 
* UADD Nos. 90-0262 & 
* 91-0008 
Respondent. * 
********************************* 
The request for an evidentiary hearing in the above 
entitled matter to review de novo the denial by the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Division dated May 7, 1993 having been duly 
considered, and it having been determined that the charging party 
has failed to overcome the jurisdictional problems with this case, 
the request must be dismissed for the following reasons: 
By letter dated March 4, 1993, the charging party requested 
that the Anti-Discrimination Division reopen her files in the above 
captioned matters and continue its investigation. This request was 
denied by letter dated May 7, 1993. On May 21, 1993 the charging 
party requested an evidentiary hearing or review. I will treat the 
UADD Director's letter of May 7, 1992 as a denial of the charging 
party's request for agency action pursuant to U.C.A. S 63-46b-
3(3)(d)(ii). The charging party's letter of May 21, 1993 will be 
treated as a request for an evidentiary hearing under U.C.A. S 63-
46b-3(3)(d)(ii). 
The charging party filed a charge of discrimination with the 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Division on April 9, 1990. She later 
requested on March 11, 1991 that her charge be withdrawn. Her 
request to withdraw her charge was approved by the Director on 
March 21, 1991. Examination of the record indicates that the 
charging party intended to request a right to sue letter from EEOC 
and pursue the matter in federal court. Instead of filing an 
action in federal court, however, the charging party filed an 
action in state district court. This action was dismissed by the 
state district court on October 19, 1992, for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. Although the district court dismissed the 
matter without prejudice, the Industrial Commission cannot now 
reassume jurisdiction because it too lacks jurisdiction. 
Under the statute in effect at the time of the charging 
party's withdrawal of her charge and at the time of the 
withdrawal's approval and the issuance of the "Notice of Right to 
Sue", presumably a new request for agency action could be made and 
could be acted upon, if timely (the 180 day state filing provision 
has been in effect since legislative change in 1985). However, the 
charging party's letters of March 4, 1993, and May 21, 1993, are 
both well beyond the 180 day mandate of the statute. Further, if 
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the current statutory version as found in Section 34-35-7•1(16) is 
considered, as may be procedurally appropriate, the requests made 
by the charging party's letters of March 4, 1993, and May 21, 1993, 
could not be accepted because the Industrial Commissions Anti-
Discrimination Division is prohibited from "commencement or 
continuation of any adjudicative proceeding" once any action under 
federal law is initiated. 
It is clear that the charging party's renewed request for 
agency action is well beyond the 180 day period for filing a charge 
of discrimination under U.C.A. S 34-35-7.1(1)(c). Therefore, we 
have no other option but to deny her request as untimely filed. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charging party's request for 
an evidentiary hearing to reopen her charges of discrimination 
before the Industrial Commission is HEREBY DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review or 
specific written objection hereto must be filed with the Commission 
within thirty (3 0) days from the date of this Order, or it shall be 
the final Order of the Commission, not subject to further review or 
appeal. A Motion for Review must be signed by the party seeking 
review; state the grounds for review and the relief requested; 
state the date upon which it was mailed; be filed with the 
undersigned, and be sent to each'party. 
'Allen 
Presiding/Administrative Law Judge 
Certified this 
ATTEST: __ 
day of K^ n.r. 
y~ / 
Patricia O. Ashby / 
Commission Secretary 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
CASE NO. 90-0262 & 91-0008 
JENNIE FEDERICO, * 
Applicant, * 
* ORDER DENYING 
vs. * 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
SEARS, ROEBUCK & COMPANY, * 
Defendants. * 
Jennie Federico seeks review of an Administrative Law Judge's 
Order which dismissed, on jurisdictional grounds, her claims that 
Sears unlawfully discriminated against her. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over 
this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. 
§34-35-7.1(11) and Utah Administrative Code R560-1-4.5. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The pertinent facts are not disputed: 
1. During 1990, Ms. Federico filed discrimination charge 
against Sears with UADD and the federal Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (MEE0Clf) . 
2. In March 1991, Ms. Federico advised UADD and EEOC that 
she intended to file a discrimination action against Sears in 
federal court. She asked both agencies to stop their 
administrative actions and requested a "Right To Sue" letter from 
EEOC. 
3. UADD acknowledged receipt of Ms. Federico's request and 
asked her to confirm her request. On March 12, 1991, she provided 
such confirmation, stating: 
I request the withdrawal of my charge because I have 
exhausted the administrative remedies and intend to file 
in federal court. 
4. On March 21, 1991, the UADD Director sent a letter to Ms. 
Federico acknowledging her request and officially closing the file 
for UADD and forwarding it to EEOC. On April 18, 1991, EEOC issued 
a Right To Sue letter. EEOC then closed Ms. Federico's 
discrimination claims. 
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5. Ms. Federico then filed an employment discrimination 
complaint against Sears in state, rather than federal, district 
court. On October 19, 1992, the state court dismissed the 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
6. On March 4, 1993, Ms. Federico asked UADD to reopen her 
prior claims against Sears. By letter dated May 7, 1993, UADD 
declined to reopen the claims on the grounds M(t)he time for filing 
has passed.If 
7. Ms. Federico then requested an evidentiary hearing before 
an Administrative Law Judge on the issue of her right to reopen her 
claims. The ALJ dismissed Ms. Federico's request, reasoning that 
because Ms. Federico had withdrawn her original charges of 
discrimination, her request to reopen such claims must be treated 
as new claims that were outside the 180 day limitation for filing 
such claims. 
8. The ALJ also concluded that under Utah Code Ann. §34-35-
7.1(16), Mthe Industrial Commission's Anti-Discrimination Division 
is prohibited from 'commencement or continuation of any 
adjudicative proceeding' once any action under federal law is 
initiated." 
9. Ms. Federico then filed a timely Motion For Review with 
the Industrial Commission. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As noted in the ALJ's decision, Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(16) 
prevents the Anti-Discrimination Division from pursuing any further 
action in this matter once any action under federal law is 
initiated. 
The record is clear that Ms. Federico withdrew her claim of 
discrimination from the Anti-Discrimination Division and then filed 
a court action to enforce her claim under federal law. Under the 
plain language of §34-35-7.1(16), the Anti-Discrimination Division 
is barred from further action on Ms. Federico's claims. 
Additionally, for the reasons given in the ALJ's decision, the 
Commission finds that Ms. Federico's request for agency action is 
barred by the 180 day filing requirement of Utah Code Ann. §34-35-
7.1(1) 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes that the UADD 
has no jurisdiction to consider Ms. Federico's claims further, and 
that the ALJ was correct in dismissing her request for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
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DECISION 
The Industrial Commission of Utah hereby affirms the ALJ's 
Order of Dismissal in this matter. It is so ordered. 
DATED this jQ ^""day of gobruary, 1994. 
Commissioner 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 20 
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition 
For Review with that Court within 30 days of the date of this 
Order. 
